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Executive Summary 
Enhancing the safety culture within trucking and motor coach industries has become a key 
area of concern given the potential impact it has on crashes and overall safety. Many 
organizations recognize that safety is compromised if the culture within their organization does 
not promote safety. Unfortunately, the specifics of a good safety culture and the methods by 
which safety culture is fostered are relatively ambiguous. A key reason for this uncertainty is the 
general lack of standardization of the highly qualitative term ―safety climate‖ within the trucking 
and motor coach industries. 
A survey by thirty-one organizations within these industries was completed as part of a 
Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program (CTBSSP) Synthesis #14. The results 
provide some insights into the safety beliefs and attitudes of these drivers and the organizational 
needs to maintain a stable workforce and positive safety climate. The report provides 
descriptions of the data collected, but lack any derived inferences that can help shape the safety 
culture. 
The results of this research project are the development of a set of key factors that capture 
the essence of a safety climate within the truck and busing industries. This is achieved using 
factor analytical techniques on the existing survey data as made available to the principal 
investigator. The result reveals a four factor model that is grouped based on the overall safety 
culture in the industry, the financial impact, internal awareness, and demand for safety. This 
outcome suggests that there are both internal and external factors that may affect a safety 
manager‘s perception of safety and safety climate within an organization, and provides insights 
for the trucking industry to communicate a safety culture to their employees. This could then 
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translate into a stable workforce, and reduce truck crashes. Future studies may need to consider 
how to both create and maintain a climate of safety. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 The American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI) released the results of a CMV, 
―crash predictor model,‖ study (Murray, Lantz and Keppler 2005) based on truck drivers' 
historical driving record data including specific violations discovered during roadside 
inspections, drivers‘ traffic conviction information, and past crash involvement. This study also 
identified effective enforcement actions to counteract issues related to driving behaviors and 
events. According to the states identified as having more traffic enforcement and lower crashes, 
successful enforcement strategies for addressing problem driver behaviors are those that exhibit 
one or more of the following four components: (1) creating aggressive driving apprehension 
programs/initiatives; (2) focusing on both CMV and non-CMV driver behavior patterns; (3) 
conducting highly visible enforcement activities using a performance-based approach to 
identifying specific crash types, driver behaviors and locations; and (4) conducting covert 
enforcement activities. Research such as this supports the premise that risky behaviors may be 
initiated by the drivers. 
 Knipling et al (2003) has indicated that some carriers have become havens for, and even 
attract, unsafe drivers. Both empirical and anecdotal evidence, however, support that ―safe‖ 
carriers—as defined by numerous metrics including SafeStat scores, safety awards and industry 
safety statistics—produce, attract and retain safe drivers. While all major components that make 
up the ―safety climate‖ of a motor carrier have not been adequately studied in past research, 
specific safety factors and correlations that contribute to safety culture do exist. These include 
compensation schema (ATA); non-financial reward programs (Transanalytics, ATRI); and ISO 
9000 certification‘s nexus to safety (Naveh, Marcus and Allen 2003). Other industry sectors such 
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as aviation, mining and heavy equipment manufacturing also contain safety-sensitive positions 
and have researched the tangible and intangible mechanisms that contribute to a positive safety 
environment. 
 As part of a Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program (CTBSSP), Short, 
Boyle et al (2007) synthesized the current available research and literature relating to safety 
culture. The study showed that there were specific ties between the available body of knowledge 
and the motor carrier industries. The effort included a data collection component consisting of 
responses to surveys and interviews from motor carrier safety managers and commercial motor 
vehicle (CMV) drivers, as well as case study data collected onsite directly from motor carriers. 
This report culminated in suggested steps for increasing safety culture through a series of best 
practices.  
 The report made a first attempt at identifying and analyzing significant safety and non-
safety programs and initiatives across relevant sectors that currently has, or could create and 
support, a positive safety culture within the trucking and motor coach industries. Some of the 
gaps identified in the report included: (1) the possibility of a disconnect between expectations 
from a safety culture and those that exist within other professional cultures within the 
organization they operate in; or, alternatively, (2) the possibility that drivers identify strictly with 
the professional culture within which they operate. These programs and initiatives resulted in a 
list of best practices with factors that are most likely to offer the greatest influence on developing 
and enhancing a culture of safety.  
 The report consists of summarized information on best hiring practices and 
communication among employees as reported by individuals within various organizations. 
However, no attempt was made to infer the reasons why these organizations consider various 
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factors optimum. These insights can only be gained with inferential statistics conducted to 
examine the responses across all participants. The lack of inferential statistics has hindered a 
quantifiable hypothesis that can be used to identify programs that will contribute to a better 
safety climate and demonstrate that the likelihood of success is not due to chance. The analysis 
proposed as part of this project will help identify non-programmatic factors that help cultivate or 
improve an overall culture of safety, such as leadership roles within management and among 
CMV drivers. 
1.2 Relevance to the MATC Theme and Thematic Thrust Areas 
 The MATC theme is ―improving safety and minimizing risk associated with increasing 
multi-modal freight movement on the U.S. surface transportation system.‖ The movement of 
freight by trucks has increased tremendously in the US. It is not surprising that crashes involving 
trucks are still proportionately high and problematic. Studies have shown that a stronger safety 
culture can provide more positive attitudes among the drivers and thereby help reduce the 
number of crashes (Arboleda, Morrow, Crum and Shelly 2003). By gaining insights in the 
perception of the safety managers, we can better design a complementary study on drivers‘ 
perception of the safety climate related to their organizations and the profession as a whole. This 
project therefore relates to the MATC theme by improving safety related to multimodal freight 
movement and can therefore improve overall safety across ground transportation systems. 
 As part of this project, data that was collected as part of CTSSP #14 will be available. 
The data analysis was completed at the University of Iowa and in coordination with Jeffrey 
Short, Senior Research Associate with the American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI). 
His areas of expertise include policy analysis and program evaluation; qualitative and 
quantitative analysis; and policy tool development and assessment. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 Commercial vehicle related crashes can result in costs related to property damage, injury 
and even fatalities. Based on US crash data, the annual number of crashes for the period 2001-
2003 involving medium to heavy trucks exceeded 430,000 and the average cost per crash was 
about $90,000 (Zaloshnja and Miller 2006). Though more recent statistics show a decline in both 
the number of crash-related injuries and fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled, truck 
involved crashes continue to cost the industry millions of dollars per year (FMCSA 2008). 
 Several studies have examined factors (e.g., fatigue and circadian rhythms, driving 
experience, crash history, etc.) related to crashes involving large trucks (Elisa R. Braver et al. 
1992; E.R. Braver, Preusser and Ulmer 1999; Hanowski, Wierwille and Dingus 2003; Lin, 
Jovanis and Yang 1994; Murray et al. 2005). Among those factors that are less examined yet still 
critical are the psychological and sociological factors within organizations (e.g., motivations, 
incentives, as well as human capital characteristics) that are related to safety issues (Rodrigues, 
Rocha, Khattak and Belzer 2003; Rodrigues, Targa and Belzer 2006). Based on the current body 
of knowledge, there appears to be an increasing awareness of organizational and individual 
attitudes and beliefs that may influence the likelihood of a crash even before a driver enters a 
vehicle (Clarke 1999; Short et al. 2007; Wills, Watson and Biggs 2006). Therefore, qualities 
associated with the safety climate can be viewed as predictive in nature, and may be highly 
useful when examining and assessing safety management within organizations (Flin 1998).  
 The concept of safety climate is defined through a synthesis of previous work 
(Guldenmund 2000). Generally, safety climate refers to employee perceptions of how safety is 
managed and how safety policies are implemented in an organization. Another related concept is 
safety culture. Within the commercial driving environment, a company‘s safety culture can be 
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identified through the attitudes, values and beliefs related to safety and risk. These are values 
held by individuals and manifested in the organization‘s safety practices, procedures and 
outcomes (Short et al. 2007). Though some individuals have used climate and culture 
interchangeably, there are certain distinctions; while culture refers to underlying beliefs, climate 
can be described as a ―check on whether the behavior of the people within the company, 
especially management and supervisors, matches the [company‘s] rhetoric‖ (Shannon and 
Norman 2008). This indicates that safety climate within an organization is more likely to change 
than the safety culture as a result of managerial actions.  
 Studies suggest a direct relationship between safety climate and safe behavior (Johnson 
2007; Tharaldsen, Olsen and Rundmo 2008; Wu, Chen and Li 2008). Thus, understanding the 
factors that influence a good safety climate can have a positive impact on an employee‘s overall 
safety performance. In research related to occupational safety, there is an increased focus on 
understanding safety climate given its potential impact in reducing fatalities and injuries (Wills 
et al. 2006).  
 It is less difficult to quantify the safety climate experienced by individuals within 
organizations through the use of survey tools than it is to quantify safety culture. Although many 
researchers have sought to find a common model of safety climate, there is little consensus on 
the dimensions that should be incorporated into such a model (Williamson, Feyer, Cairns and 
Biancotti 1997). Reasons for this may be due to differences in the nations and industries that 
organizations operate within (Shannon and Norman 2008). There are, however, areas that have 
consistently been part of the safety climate discussion and the first of these is related to 
management (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor and Bryden 2000). The structure of safety climate has 
been examined from two different but related aspects of management: managers‘ attitudes 
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toward safety (Clarke 1999; Zohar 1980) and management practice, such as safety rules, 
management commitment, and safety policies (Isla & Díaz 1997; Johnson 2007; Williamson et 
al. 1997; Wills et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2008). These two aspects are intertwined because good 
managerial attitudes are most likely needed to reinforce good managerial practices (Zohar 1980). 
 Therefore, one step in understanding the safety climate within organizations is to 
understand the relationship of this concept to safety management. The OSHA Compliance and 
Management Handbook (1993) suggests that Alderfer‘s ERG (Existence, Relatedness and 
Growth) theory can provide insight into the organizational motivation for safety. In this theory, 
―existence‖ refers to the need for basic material and physiological desires, ―relatedness‖ refers to 
the need for positive feedback and respect from others, and ―growth‖ refers to the need for self 
development (Alderfer 1969). Although this model is used to explain motivations on an 
individual level, it can be applied to explain motivations on organizational levels as well. 
 Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000) stated that changing employees‘ awareness of and 
motivation for safety is necessary before the improvements in safety climate can have impact on 
overall safety. In addition, safety attitudes has been shown to be a predictor of safety climate 
(Isla and Díaz 1997). Therefore, it can be argued that understanding safety attitudes and 
motivation is an essential step to improve the safety climate in organizations.  
 This study focuses on management attitudes and considers factors that are largely related 
to the safety climate within commercial vehicle operations. Although other factors such as 
worker involvement and communication can have a strong influence on the safety climate 
(Williamson et al. 1997; Wills et al. 2006), managers‘ attitudes (especially safety manager 
attitudes) toward safety can also have a strong influence on how safety is managed and perceived 
by employees, as is depicted in figure 2.1. In such an environment, employees may exhibit 
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behavior that supports more urgent non-safety related goals—such as getting products out 
quickly and making a profit—rather than focusing primarily on safety-related priorities (Johnson 
2007).  
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Interaction of Factors Related to Safety Climate and Culture as shown in the Literature 
 
 The goal of this study is to develop a set of latent, or hidden, variables that capture the 
essence of safety manager attitudes. Thus, this study will investigate the structure of motivations 
that affect a safety manager‘s perception of safety. It is hypothesized that these key factors may 
not be easily quantified, but do have substantial impacts on the safety climate within 
transportation organizations. 
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Chapter 3 Data Analysis 
3.1 Method 
 Data from a survey distributed to safety managers as part of a research project sponsored 
by the National Academies Transportation Research Board, Commercial Truck and Bus Safety 
Synthesis Program (CTBSSP) was analyzed for this study. The survey was administered to 
twenty-five safety managers at trucking companies and five safety managers at motor coach 
companies. The survey questions were designed to assess manager‘s perceptions of safety and 
included questions on available incentive programs, investments in technology and safety 
certificate programs, as well as demographics of the safety department and the company as a 
whole (including crash records). 
 A factor analysis was conducted on the survey questions related to the concept of safety 
climate. Questions that were not related to perception were omitted (e.g., ―How many power 
units does your company operate?‖; ―How many employees (excluding drivers) does your 
company employ?‖). A total of seventeen variables were used in the analysis which included 
questions regarding the safety manager‘s perceptions of the motivations for improving company 
safety, the relationship between safety culture and driver turnover, other factors related to safety, 
and manager perceptions of others‘ attitudes regarding their company‘s safety practices. 
Responses to these questions were based on a Likert scale. One question included seven separate 
items related to the motivations for improving company safety ranked in order of importance. 
Respondents were asked to rank the topics with 1 as ―the most important‖ and 7 as ―the least 
important,‖ and they were instructed to use each number only once when answering the survey. 
Additionally, seven items about attitudes related to company-wide and industry-wide safety 
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practices was scaled from 1 as ―strongly agree‖ to 5 as ―strongly disagree‖ with 3 indicating 
―uncertain.‖ The remaining questions were scaled from 1 as a positive to 3 as a negative answer.  
 There were three different Likert-scales used in the survey. Therefore, prior to conducting 
the factor analysis, all responses were recoded to be of the same weight. The values ranged from 
-3 for least important or strongly disagree [negative response] to +3 for strongly disagree or most 
important [positive response] with 0 for uncertain [neutral].  
 A principal factor analysis was conducted in SAS 9.1 using the factor procedure, and for 
more information refer to Der and Everitt (2002). It should be additionally noted that factor 
analytic techniques have been used to generate a better understanding of safety culture and safety 
climate in past research (Clarke 1999; Cooper 2000; Flin et al. 2000; F.W. Guldenmund 2000; 
F.W. Guldenmund 2007; Singer et al. 2003; Tharaldsen et al. 2008). The squared multiple 
correlations were used to estimate the prior communality estimates. Both orthogonal and oblique 
rotation methods were used. The number of factors retained was based on an assessment both of 
eigenvalues and ‗elbow‘ in the scree plot (Kachigan 1991). Several ‗nfactor‘ of factor analysis 
were conducted to determine different combinations of factors that can be best interpreted. 
3.2 Results  
 The survey results showed that safety managers viewed safety as a top priority or at least 
equal to other major priorities, such as customer and operational concerns. About two-thirds of 
the survey respondents reported that safety is integrated into driver screening, hiring, discipline, 
firing and also into compensation, benefits, and incentives.  
 Before conducting factor analysis, one item—―how does your company‘s safety culture 
relate to driver turnover?‖—was omitted due to its highly skewed distributions: more than 75% 
of responses were the same for this question.  
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 Four factors were extracted based on eigenvalues (>1). One item—the importance of 
setting a high industry safety standard as a motivation for improving company safety—failed to 
load significantly (<0.3) on any factors. Thus, this question was removed and no longer 
considered in the analysis. A factor analysis was then conducted without this variable, resulting 
in fifteen total items, and, despite these alterations, a four factor solution was still obtained and 
accounted for 81.8% of the total variance. The factor loading results of orthogonal and oblique 
rotations were similar and therefore the outcome of the former are presented here. 
 A 0.4 cutoff point (Williamson et al. 1997) was used in the final solution. For this reason, 
one item failed to load on any factors and thus was moved to the ―not included‖ category. Other 
items loaded well on one of the four factors, but some also had similar high loadings on other 
factors. The cross-loadings were addressed based on conceptual as well as internal consistency of 
factors using Cronbach‘s alpha (Pett, Lackey and Sullivan 2003). The bolded loading scores 
shown in table 3.1 are the final solution after addressing overlapped variables. The final 
Cronbach‘s alpha ranged from 0.59 to 0.69 which is relatively close to the standard of 0.7 
(Litwin 1995).  
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Table 3.1 Factor Loadings for the Four Latent Variables of the Safety Attitudes of Managers 
 
 
*Note: These loadings were observed to load high on two factors but were not included in this factor because they 
lowered the Cronbach‘s alpha value. 
 
 The first factor explained 27.3% of the variance and is labeled as ―the financial impact of 
safety.‖ This factor is related more to the financial implications when safety is not considered, 
and includes enforcement issues, civil litigation, attracting customers and drivers, and insurance 
costs. The initial Cronbach‘s alpha of this factor was 0.47, which is relatively low. Further 
investigation of the variables indicated that one of the items, ―perception of whether our insurers 
help make us a safer company,‖ should be dropped since it was not consistent with the others by 
lowering the alpha score. When this variable was dropped, a significantly higher alpha score 
resulted (α=0.68) and this final structure was retained.  
 The second factor can be called the ―internal awareness of safety,‖ and it explains 19.4% 
of the variance with alpha score of 0.62. This factor was highly loaded by respondents‘ 
perception of the customer‘s value of safety, the general public‘s opinion of an individual 
 12 
 
company and industry safety efforts and the importance of reducing crashes as a motivation for 
improving safety within an organization. All of the variables explain some aspect related to the 
reasons a company may value safety within the organization.  
 The third factor, which explained 17.6% of variance with alpha of 0.59, can be identified 
as ―demand for safety‖ and is derived from the factor based on attracting drivers as a reason for 
safety. It can be considered as one aspect of competition among different companies, as it is 
associated with the two central questions: whether drivers from other companies see the 
manager‘s company as a safe one, and how other drivers outside the company influence drivers 
within the company. 
 The last factor can be interpreted as ‗overall safety culture in the industry,‘ because it 
incorporates safety manager concerns of whether general commercial motor vehicle drivers 
operate in a culture of safety, and of how the overall culture in the industry impacts company 
safety efforts. The variance explained by this factor is 17.5% with alpha of 0.69. 
 Table 3.2 shows the small intercorrelation scores between factors extracted from original 
variables. The Pearson Correlation Coefficients, shown in table 3.3, also shows that there was no 
obvious linear dependence between any two factors. Therefore, all four factors are relatively 
independent and can be considered as four different aspects that influence the motivation for 
maintaining a good safety climate.  
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Table 3.2 Intercorrelation of Factors Extracted 
 
Table 3.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients (PCC) of Extracted Factors 
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Factor1 1.00 0.04 0.12 -0.16 
Factor2  1.00 -0.04 0.20 
Factor3   1.00 -0.11 
Factor4    1.00 
 
 
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Factor1 1.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 
Factor2  1.00 0.04 0.01 
Factor3   1.00 0.04 
Factor4    1.00 
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Chapter 4 Findings and Conclusion 
 This study expands on the results presented in Short et al. (2007) and suggests that a four 
factor model accounting for 81.8% of the total variance was best to explain motivations of safety 
manager attitudes towards safety. The four factors include different aspects of safety managers‘ 
perceptions and considerations related to safety: the financial impact of safety, internal 
awareness of safety, demand for safety, and overall safety culture in the industry. These four 
factors can be considered as influences of safety managers‘ attitudes toward safety both 
internally—the financial cost of safety, internal awareness of safety and demand for safety—and 
externally: that is, the overall safety culture in the industry. This indicates that future 
investigations into creating and maintaining a positive safety climate and attitude may need to 
examine both the internal functioning of organizations as well as the industry as a whole.  
 Although there is no factor structure in former safety climate studies that are similar to 
this study, due to the focus on different aspects of safety consciousness, the internal factors can 
be supported by the Alderfer‘s ERG theory of motivation, which was mentioned earlier. To 
explain this theory at an organizational level, existence needs can be considered as those 
involving an organization‘s financial interests—namely, investment in safety practices and 
technologies that have a clear investment return. On the other hand, related needs can be 
classified as needs involving external feedback, such as that from customers, regulators and 
safety audits. Finally, growth needs can be considered as needs involving an organization‘s self-
development, which are determined through the measurement of safety performance. This study 
shows that it is several aspects of an organization‘s needs that affect safety managers‘ perception 
of safety and act as motivations to maintain a good safety attitude. 
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 The strongest factor in the model which accounted for the highest level of variability is 
the financial implications if safety is not met. The outcomes of the factor analysis show that 
financial considerations are a critical factor for organizations, and may have a larger influence on 
safety managers than expected. Safety managers‘ primary concern is the overall safety of their 
organization, but they may also realize the financial implications of not having high safety 
standards. Trucking organizations do apprehend the benefits from good safety performance since 
accident-related costs can be avoided. It is also possible that insurance costs will decrease as 
good safety performance is maintained, and safe companies may have a better ability to attract 
safer drivers. These factors show basic needs for organizations to survive in a highly-competitive 
industry. Therefore, safety managers‘ concern for such factors, as well as the concerns of 
company owners and/or top executives (which greatly influence the actions of safety managers), 
can be considered as motivated by existence needs: the basic need to survive in ERG theory.  
 The result also suggests that internal awareness of safety can be reflective of the safety 
attitudes of managers. Different from the first factor, this awareness is not caused by the direct 
relationship between safety and financial interests, but caused by how the manager values the 
overall safety beliefs within society, including the perception of the organization itself. As the 
value of safety increases among society, the pressure and awareness of enhance safety within the 
organization should increase as well. However, if organizations fail to value and account for 
societal concerns, the organization‘s attitude may not change. This factor therefore is greatly 
pertinent to the ―relatedness‖ needs of the organization: that is, ―feedback from peers‖ 
(Charleston 1993). 
 The last two factors in the result are relatively weak compared with the former two, since 
they contain only two variables each and explain less variance. However, it is still worthwhile to 
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consider the possible impacts on a manager‘s safety attitude. The demand for safety has to do 
with the safety manager‘s concerns about competing levels of safety between organizations; 
safety acts as an attractive quality to potential employees, which helps in hiring and retaining 
good drivers. Accordingly, this is also derived from the relatedness needs of company. The 
overall safety culture in the industry can influence individual organizations safety attitudes and 
values. That is, if the whole industry holds a poor safety value, it is not surprising that companies 
within the industry do as well. Subsequently, safety managers may not have a high safety value 
as they may not have the pressure to consider safety issues important.  
 There are several limitations to this study. The dataset analyzed included thirty survey 
respondents and was collected during an original study conducted by Short, Boyle, Shackelford, 
Inderbitzen and Bergoffen (2007). Factor analyses are typically conducted with sample sizes 
much larger than this. This may have caused the lower Cronbach‘s Alpha scores compared to 
other factor analysis studies when measuring the internal consistency. Thus, further investigation 
should be conducted on the reliability of this structure by adopting a larger sample size. 
Additionally, due to the small sample size, few variables could be included in the analysis.  
 Regardless of these limitations this study provides an initial indication of some of the 
constructs that relate to the safety climate perceived by safety managers in commercial vehicle 
operations. More specifically, this study indicates that safety manager attitudes toward safety are 
motivated by certain relationships between safety performance and the consequences of unsafe 
performance. Enhancing safety attitudes by emphasizing this relationship will help establish a 
high safety culture within the industry.  
 
 17 
 
Chapter 5 Recommendations for Future Projects 
 For future studies, it would be valuable to examine the constructs not captured in this 
survey but still of great importance, including managers‘ understanding of drivers and 
customers‘ priority for safety versus other competing demands, and the competition related to 
safety among companies. Therefore, a survey specifically designed to assess managers‘ safety 
attitudes is warranted to improve the current factor structure obtained from this study. It would 
have been useful to have a similar questionnaire with responses on a 7-point Likert scale to 
obtain more precise feedback from managers. In addition, adopting a larger sample size is 
essential to verify the reliability of the factor structure. A sample size around 250 is 
recommended for future studies.  
 It may also be interesting to see whether the priorities and factor structure of safety 
attitudes is different among different management levels. Previous studies have shown that 
differences in the safety culture attitudes and perceptions of individuals at different levels of 
management exist in large organizations (Singer et al. 2003). Therefore, comparing the safety 
attitude using the same questionnaire may provide greater insights about how the safety climate 
can be improved.  
 In manufacturing, differences in attitudes among managers can relate to number of 
incidents (Nielsen, Rasmussen, Glasscock and Spangenberg 2008). Hence, it would be valuable 
to gather data related to the attitudes of managers and compare that to different crash rates per 
miles driven in each organization.  
 It is recognized that a manager‘s attitude toward safety is just one aspect of a good safety 
climate. As shown earlier in figure 2.1, there are other safety-related factors not addressed in this 
study including worker involvement, attitudes toward safety (Williamson et al. 1997), and 
communication between managers and workers (R. Flin 2000; Wills et al. 2006). Therefore, 
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additional studies based on commercial vehicle driver perceptions about safety and the 
communication effectiveness within organization may provide additional insight on how to 
achieve a ―good‖ safety climate. To achieve this goal, similar questionnaires can be designed for 
commercial drivers. Based on previous safety climate studies of Zohar (1980) and Wills et 
al.(2006), example questions to be asked in the survey can include: ―How important is safety 
training?‖; ―Rank the priority of following items from most important to least important (safety, 
on-time delivery, customer, etc.).‖; ―How do safety managers value safety?‖; ―How do the 
company safety rules influence your safety performance while driving?‖ Similar to the manager 
questionnaires, a 7-point Likert scale would be preferred in order to attain more precise 
responses.  
 In general, the culture set forth by a company greatly impacts the drivers‘ attitudes and 
their overall perception of safety. Further research in this area can help provide insights that help 
foster a good safety culture and mitigate the impacts of risky driving performance. 
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